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ADEQUACY OF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY: I*

Curtis Wright,

Jr.t

view of frequent judicial complaints about "instructions by the
acre," it may be appropriate to begin with a short justification for
an article bearing a title which might appear to suggest an antithetical
problem, that is, the existence of a question as to the adequacy of
instructions to the jury. To this end one might repeat the assertion
that the verdict of a jury which is not instructed as to the fundamental
law of the case is "crackerbarrel justice."1 If this is true, it certainly is
also true that the mere number of instructions given is no guarantee of
their adequacy. Furthermore, the general practice of submitting too
many instructions has sometimes caused a reaction to an even less
desirable extreme-the complete waiver of instructions ( where permissible) by stipulation. In Missouri, for instance, that practice became
so prevalent that the supreme court of that state had to work out an
unusual solution, as will later appear. Finally, the very giving of such
great numbers of instructions is often rooted in fear on the part of the
trial judge that refusal of any correct and applicable request may be a
violation of his Duty to Charge.
"Duty to Charge" is the rubric under which many of the cases considered herein may be found. For the purposes of this article, however,
the phrase "adequacy of the charge" is more accurately descriptive. It
has wider scope than the conventional "duty to charge," which, furthermore, has been found to have no fixed meaning, being used to signify
anything from a semipoetic, unformed ideal to the rule of reversible
error for failure to read all written requests which are correct and
applicable. At its best the conventional phrase may indicate solicitude
for thorough presentation of the issues and the law to the jury. At its
worst it may simply be one of the many spikes in the abatis which was

I
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:r- A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of Michigan Law Schoolin conjunction with previously published articles cited in notes 4 and 8 below-in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree.
t Associate Professor, Temple University School of Law.-Ed.
1 Note, 23 MICH. L. RBv. 276 at 278 (1925). See also Trusty, ''The Value of Clear
Instructions," 15 KAN. Ctn L. RBv. 9 (1947).
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erected in the American trial court's path in the nineteenth century. 2
The present article is the third of a series of articles on various
aspects of the charge to the jury in civil cases.3 The first of the series4
treated the movement to rehabilitate the judicial function from the
position to which it had been relegated in the majority of the states.
In particular it considered results attained through concerted efforts
of segments of the bench and bar under leadership such as that of the
American Bar Association. The debasing of the judicial office was
shown to have come about by means of a variety of legislative restraints
which, it was argued, are now obsolete holdovers from colonial and
pioneer times. Such restriction was based on the requirement that the
charge be on "matters of law only." Thereafter there grew up what
will here be called indirect restraints, such as the requirements that all
instructions be in writing, that the charge be confined to a process
whereby. the court simply received written requests, marked each
"given" or "refused," and read aloud to the jury all those marked
"given" without alteration or modification. It became possible in some
states to preserve error in instructions by a simple general objection.
Then many of the southern and western states came to require that
instructions precede arguments of counsel, thus leaving little chance
for the court's words to make any impression on the jurors that they
would carry to the juryroom.
That article found that in the past twenty-five years the states of
Michigan, California, New Mexico and Maryland had been reclaimed
and are now for the most part in substantial compliance with the
recommendations of the section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association regarding trial practice,5 adopted by the House
of Delegates in 1938.6 Some other phases of this struggle were also
recounted, such as an abortive revival in Colorado, a brief interlude of
partial reform in Illinois, and minor modifications of indirect restraints
in certain other states. 7
Pound, ''The Judicial Office in America," 10 BosT. UNIV. L. REv. 125 at 127 (1930).
A series in that all relate to Instructions and have been published in related order,
although they have appeared in three different periodicals (notes 4 and 8 infra). Grateful
acknowledgment is made of the direction and counsel supplied, in connection with the
preparation of this entire series, by Professors William Wirt Blume, Charles W. Joiner, and
John W. Reed of the faculty of the University of Michigan Law School.
4 Wright, ''The Invasion of Jury: Temperature of the War," 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 137
(1953) (cited hereinafter without reference to title, author, or "initial page).
5 Report of the Section of Judicial Administration, 63 A.B.A. REP. 522 at 523 (1938).
6 63 A.B.A. REP. 154 (1938).
7 Utah, South Dakota, North Carolina, South Carolina. The term "indirect restraints,"
in the present connection, refers to restrictions such as the requirement that instructions be
read verbatim from written requests, that instructions precede closing arguments of counsel,
etc.
2
3
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The second article8 analyzed the practice of some sixteen other
states in an intermediate group9 in which the court is theoretically permitted or even encouraged to review the facts, so long as there is no
comment on the evidence. It was found that three of these states were
largely indistinguishable from the minority of states in which the
judges have the "common law powers"-since the comment power is
subject to scrutiny almost everywhere within the American version of
that system.10 As to the rest of the intermediate group, however, it became clear that the summary is not used in practice. Any attempt to
recapitulate the facts in the charge leaves a judgment on the jury verdict vulnerable to attack on the ground that the summary had involved
comment. Another reason for disuse, in a number of the intermediate
states, was the exclusive use of written instructions, which made a general charge designed to include a recapitulation of the evidence quite
impracticable. One exception was North Carolina, where summary is
mandatory-a requirement which makes for unceasing difficulties, and
many reversals for comment.
On the basis of the described previous articles, and with the caveat
that this broad generalization must be taken as qualified by the detailed
discussion to be found in the cited articles, certain states will herein be
taken as "unrestricted." That is, at least some degree of comment
power, however closely scrutinized, is taken to exist in California, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Vermont.11 As examples of the sort of qualification
necessary, it is mentioned that the customary practice in New York is to
stop with a statement of the barest outline of the facts. Even in this
group, certain of the indirect restraints are nevertheless to be found
here and there, such as the use of written instructions (subject to
waiver) in California and New Mexico, and the giving of the charge
prior to arguments of counsel in Maryland and New Mexico.
BWright, "Instructions to the Jw:y: Summary Without Comment," 1954 WASH.
Umv. L.Q. 177 (cited hereinafter without reference to title, author, or initial page).
9 Wyoming, Nevada, Kansas, Nebraska and Utah; Iowa, Ohio, Georgia and North
Carolina; Delaware, Alabama and Tennessee; Wisconsin, Minnesota, (Maryland), Massachusetts and Maine.
lO The so-called common law power to comment on the evidence is currently believed
by the writer to be found in its purest form in New Jersey and Connecticut, with Pennsylvania a close third. Other states in which the power exists (in descending order of the
general freedom accorded the court) are Rhode Island, Michigan, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York and California.
11 In addition to this alphabetical listing, one may also see, in note 10 supra, the
writer's personal attempt to arrange these states in order of extent of the comment power,
taking into consideration not only the theoretical power, but also the presence or absence
of indirect restraints and estimated prevalence of the prerogative's actual exercise.
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In combination with the earlier articles which emphasized particular
aspects, the purpose here will he to show in general outline the methods
of instructing the jury in all forty-eight states. As the map printed
herein will indicate, that effort is pointed toward estimating the extent
to which the several systems appear to promote ( or discourage, as the
case may he) adequacy of the charge.12 The states are shown white,
faint ruled, dark ruled, or black as their systems have seemed more or
less functional in that respect. Such comparisons, it must be confessed,
are purely personal and in no sense unbiased. To the contrary, the
evaluations are very biased indeed, and amount in large part to an
appraisal of the extent to which the state practices seem to conform to
the American Bar Association's 1938 recommendations.13 Those recommendations (hereinafter referred to as "the minimum standards")1 4
represent certain standards which must he attained "if the administration of justice in America is to he responsive to the needs of our times."15
It may he of some interest to mention in passing that those minimum standards, and thus the present point of view, do not in all respects represent the prepossessions with which the writer commenced
detailed study of this subject four years ago. While those standards
seem increasingly necessary and basic the longer one examines them,
they are in any event the inevitable yardstick, since there are no other
standards. Law evolves, said Dean Pound, in the first instance from
rules to principles.16 Then the development of concepts is its third
stage, but standards are its highest development. In the present area,
mere rules will be found in abundance, together with a fair share of
principles and concepts. But the fulminating legislation of the nineteenth century in its present-day survivals, as well as the particularistic
12 See
13 See

map, p. 515.
note 5 supra.
14 Of these recommendations, the two which are most important to this discussion are
the Trial Practice recommendations numbered (I) and (2), which are as follows:
"(1) Common Law Power of Judge Should be Restored. That the common law
concept of the function and authority of the trial judge be uniformly restored in the states
which have departed therefrom.
"(2) Duty of Judge to Charge Jury. That after the evidence has been closed and
counsel have concluded their arguments to the jury, the trial judge should instruct the
jury orally as to the law of the case, and should have power to advise them as to the facts
by summarizing and analyzing the evidence and commenting upon the weight and credibility of the evidence or upon any part of it, always leaving the final decision on questions
of fact to the jury." 63 A.B.A. REP. 523 (1938).
15 Foreword by Arthur T. Vanderbilt to Reports of the Section of Judicial Administration, 63 A.B.A. REP. 517 (1938).
16 Pound, ''The Administration Application of Legal Standards," 44 A.B.A. REP. 445
at 454 (1919); PoUND, AN lNrnoDuCTioN TO nm PHILosoPHY oF LAw 101 (1922). See
also PoUND, fuPELLATE PnoCBDtmE IN CIVIL CASBS 227 (1941).
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rules of decision, on the one hand, and the dicta of vague and unformed
ideals on the other, can be ordered only by reference to standards.
Throughout the analysis which follows, the requirement that instructions be given in writing will at no time be overlooked. The
resulting practice, under which the written instructions are read verbatim by the court and then handed to the jury, is believed to be at the
root of many of the evils of the instructing system. The remedy is
simply to restore the orality of the charge in accordance with trial practice standard (2), which provides, "... after ... counsel have concluded their arguments to the jury, the trial judge should instruct the
jury orally . . . and should have power to advise them as to the
facts ...."17
In general, the movement toward improvement of the charge has
been a straightforward attempt to restore the comment power. We may
wonder if we have begun at the wrong end; it is possible that if the
indirect restraints, the seemingly minor matters, were improved, the
larger goals might then be accessible. It is indisputable that the obscurity of instructions results in large part from requirements that they be
read verbatim from written requests. The additional requirement that
they contain nothing "in the nature of comment'' contributes its share
to their meaninglessness. The primary factor making toward meaningfulness, on the other hand, is orality-delivery, with the repetition and
emphasis necessary to convey meaning.18 The indispensability of oral
instruction, it will be seen, runs through this study, and is given weight
in the estimates of adequacy in analyses of the states' practices.
Forty percent of reversals on appeals are caused by faulty instructions, says an expert on instructions in one of the much-restricted jurisdictions.19 One might therefore question whether correctness of instructions should not claim precedence over the matter of adequacy.
The answer to that query is best stated by suggesting several of the
factors which led to the choice of the adequacy approach. In the first
place, adequacy is a neglected subject,20 whereas the very opposite is
true as to the matter of correctness. The striving for correctness has
already been carried to a fine point of analysis, as the opinions no less
than the treatises show. Errors of commission, it seems, have been
17 See

note 14 supra.
''Instructions to the Jury," 3 F.R.D. 113 (1942); Soper, "The Charge to
the Jury," 1 F.R.D. 540 (1940).
19 Trusty, ''The Value of Clear Instructions," 15 KAN. CITY L. REv. 9 (1947).
2 0 A notable exception is the discussion in Mrr.r.An, Crv:u. PROCEDURE OF nm TIUAL
COURT IN llisTORlCAL PERSPECTIVE 314 (1952).
18 Chesnut,
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taken through all stages of the process of philosophical refinement,
which begins with classification and analysis, and ends in casuistry.
Many are the opinions that remind us that we have become too technical and refined in ferreting out defects in instructions which by bare
possibility might have misled some juryman. 21
In another sense, however, adequacy includes the correctness problem in that an inadequacy is simply an error of omission rather than
of commission. It is believed that discussion of errors of omission raise,
although incidentally, the general outlines of the requirements of correctness. Furthermore, those contours are presented in the forms of
exaggerations which make sharp some distinctions not otherwise recognizable. Finally, errors of omission open up less of the substantive
law and make coverage of all states somewhat more manageable for
both writer and reader.
Rules as to the necessities and manner of objections, however, are
inseparable from discussion of any kind of error. Objections, in tum,
are tied in with the widespread practice of presettlement of instructions.
To a certain extent presettlement of instructions is a part of the system
in force under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and is used very
generally outside of the New England states. The form which presettlement takes, however, may vary from the provision of the federal
rule that "the court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon
[counsel's written] requests prior to their arguments to the jury ..."22
to the ritual of the jurisdictions where the court may simply read such
of the instructions, drafted by counsel, as it deems to be correct. The
"three piles" system was graphically described by Chief Justice Cartwright of Illinois in 1916, being that of the sorting of perhaps a hundred requests into piles of those to be marked "given," "refused," or to
be given further study.23 At a presettlement conference-of course-court and counsel discuss to some extent the action proposed by the
court as to the "three piles." Even as to these sometimes very friendly
little confabs, however, the general rules of law as to the necessity for•
specific objections come to be somewhat blunted. To say the least,
there is a strong feeling on the part of many that counsel should not be
21 Wolfe, J., dissenting in State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113 at 134, 170 P. (2d) 153
(1946).
22Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 51, 28 U.S.C. (1952) following §2072.
23 Cartwright, ''Present But Taking No Part," 10 Iu.. L. lrnv. 537 at 540 (1916).
That Illinois system is, surprisingly to many lawyers of the Atlantic seaboard, not far from
being typical or perhaps the "average" of the country taken as a whole-as to state court
practices.
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compelled to elect upon what grounds he £nds fault with the proposed
action of the judge. That is, he should not make such election until
his motion for new trial after a verdict which displeases him.
It seems to be the law in a number of states that a general objection
suffices to preserve error as to the giving or refusing of instructions.
There are several arguments made in support of this rule. One seems
to be that there is little to be gained by disputation if the judge has
already decided to mark the instruction as "given." In jurisdictions like
those of the south, where the settlement takes on more the character of
rulings on points for charge and where the ruling on requests may take
place in the courtroom (sometimes in the presence of the jurors), deference is paid to a common law tradition that pointing out the mistakes
of His Honor is a "delicate and difficult task'' and (contrary to the
practice of Tidd and Chitty) counsel is not put to that embarrassment.24
Another argument, being the one which has prevailed in Missouri, has
been vigorously stated by an experienced member of that state's rules
committee:
"... a rule, waiving prejudicial error unless specific objection or
specific assignment is made, certainly is not in the interest of justice and is a step backward rather than forward. Review of prejudicial errors in instructions should not be foreclosed and justice
denied on any theory of waiver." 215
On that subject, there is certainly a place for "the luxury of disagreement."26 As to partial failure to instruct, on the other hand, there
is diversity; the matter is somewhat less controversial. There seems to
be a somewhat better chance to find common ground for discussion
here, since the rule is very generally recognized that if error is to be
predicated upon a failure to instruct ( especially upon some particular
matter), a showing is required that the omission was pointed out with
sufficient clarity to have enabled the court to cure such deficiency
before the jury retired. Such is doubtless the universal rule as to matters
which are merely incidental, as to which a request for the desired instruction is usually a condition precedent to raising the point on appeal.
Then at the other extreme there is a general recognition that some matters may be so basic and fundamental to a given cause that their noninclusion cannot be waived by any nonfeasance of counsel.27
24 Steinberg

v. South Carolina Power Co., 165 S.C. 367, 163 S.E. 881 (1932).
1 CARR, MissotnU Crvrr. PnocEDtmll, p. 271, n. 93.5 (1947; Supp. 1952).
26 CLABK, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., p. V (1947).
27 Fimdamental error: e.g., Simonton v. James, (5th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 174.
Discussion of this doctrine recurs in state discussions to follow, see esp. Pa. and N.J.
25
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Doubtless the problem of objections should be considered less in
terms of whether a general objection suffices than from the standpoint
of what kind of error may be preserved by a general objection. In the
viewpoint of many, including the writer, only that which is basic and
fundamental should be covered by a general objection. That last statement says very little, however, since no objection whatsoever is needed
in order to enable review of basic error.28 At this point, however, it
should be mentioned that it is not within the scope of this paper to
discuss appellate procedure as such. The sole concern here is with
the adequacy of instructions from the standpoint of their (admittedly
somewhat conjectural) enlightenment of the jury as weighed against
the avoidance of new trials. Whether the new trial is granted by the
trial court in response to a motion or is granted by an appellate court
upon appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial is for present
purposes only slightly more than incidental if the new trial is granted
for error (especially error of omission) in the instructions. Thus references to "assignment of error," "taking exception," and the like, ~
they may crop up here and there in the present discussion, are not to
be taken as referring to the technical requirements of appellate procedure. 29 The basic meaning of objection, as the term is herein used, will
be telling the court of its supposed or alleged mistake in time to permit
rectification, that is, in time for the court to avoid inadvertent error. 80
That general objections are no favorite of the law is a commonplace.
Apart from the minority argument in favor of permitting general objections to "preserve error" as to the charge, and except for the doctrine of
fundamental error, the traditional attitude of the law coincides with
that stated in the very first volume of Arizona reports:
"Many trials under such a [general objection] system would
practically never end. The effect of it would be to compel one
party to fight in the dark, not knowing when his opponent intended to strike, while the other would be free to choose his
weapons, and the time and place to use them. Such things may
do in love or war, when all things are said to be fair; but life is too
short to transact business on such a system in courts of justice."31
The reminder that trial must have finality and that life is short
returns one to the minimum standards of trial practice.82 It must be
28 By definition, fundamental error (basic error) will be noticed on review, even when
not assigned as error. BLAcx:'s I.Aw DICTIONARY, 3d ed., p. 677 (1933).
29 See, however, PoUND, APPELLATE PnoCEDUBE IN CIVIL CASES 126-136 (1941).
30 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 46, set out in text, p. 513.
31Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. 99 at 123, 25 P. 816 (1874).
32 Report of the Section of Judicial Administration, 63 A.B.A. REP. 522 at 523 (1938).
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remembered that they incorporate or adopt the federal rules of civil
procedure as being the ideal or at least the standard of a simplified and
modem practice adapted and further adaptable to the requirements of
a changing and expanding economy. The most pertinent of those rules
is, of course, rule 51 :
"At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the
trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may :6.le written
requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in
the requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action
upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the
court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed. No
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects
and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to
make the objection out of the hearing of the jury."
Coupled also with that rule, for the purposes of the present discussion, is the more general provision of rule 46:
"Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; but for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore
been necessary it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling
or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court
the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to
the action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if a party
has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is
made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice
. "
hIm.
The acceptance or adaptation of the federal rules of civil procedure
generally into the systems of the various states is easily the most striking development of recent years in µie pattern of American state practice. Changes modeled after those rules are easily discernible in at least
twenty-three of the states. On the other hand, it is equally noticeable
that the trial rules which were just now cited, as well as the minimum
standards of trial practice which are associated with those rules, have
found less favor. For example, one may mark off on the map a solid
block of states consisting of Colorado, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona,
Nevada, Utah and Wyoming wherein some or all of the federal rules
have been adopted. Yet, as will be seen, none of those states has accepted rule 51 without more or less drastic modification in the direction
of the prior state practice. Next one notices that all those states have
a number of characteristics in common. They are, for instance, young
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states, sparsely populated, but fast-growing. The relative absence of
metropolitan congestion is another common denominator and one which
is believed to throw considerable light on reluctance to accept rule 5 I.
Even were such not the case, however, it is £rmly believed that no
procedural study can afford to ignore the metropolitan court problem.33
Docket congestion resulting from urban concentration is clearly the
most pressing problem in judicial administration, and one which must
not be slighted.34
With those factors in mind, therefore, the analyses which follow
as to the adequacy question are correlated (insofar as any significant
relation appears) to dates of admission of the states, population density,
rate of population increase, and the presence or absence of docket congestion. For the latter element figures have been used which were
recently made available by the Institute of Judicial Administration in
its 1954 Calendar Status Study (Civil Cases) as to state trial courts of
general jurisdiction.35 That survey developed "a comparative picture,
on a state-by-state basis, of court congestion and trial delays." In particular it reveals the available information as to the number of months
elapsing from "at issue" to trial in civil·cases. The first such study was
introduced by the following comment, which will be found enlightening to the later discussion:
"The nation-wide averages for the 97 courts represented in the
study show an average time interval of 11.5 months from At Issue
to trial of jury cases.... With respect to jury cases, there is a general over-all correlation between the size of population of the
county area comprising the court's jurisdiction and the delay in
reaching trial, although the range within each major population
group is a wide one."36
Few will gainsay that the law of procedure must seek to satisfy the
aroused interest of American society in securing reasonably prompt
33 See, e.g., VmTOE, SURVEY 011 METROPOLITAN CotmTs: DETROIT AREA (1950).
See also the American Bar Association Handbook, prepared by the Section of Judicial
Administration, THE IMPROVEMENT 011 THE ADMINISTRATION 011 JoSTICI!, 3d ed., 90-94
(1952).
34 "Legal Log Jam in Chicago," LIPE 127 (November 10, 1952). See also the series
by Russell Porter which appeared in the New York Times during the week of Jan. 18,
1954 and the series by Frank H. Weir in the Philadelphia Inquirer commencing Feb. 17,
1954.
35 Second Annual Calendar Status Study, Institute of Judicial Administration, 40
Washington Square South, New York City (June 30, 1954).
,
36 The quotations are taken from the introduction by Dr. Sheldon D. Elliott, Director
of the Institute of Judicial Administration, to the first of the Calendar status studies, published in 1953. The 1954 report, the figures of which are used herein, shows a delay of
11.1 months as opposed to the 1953 figure of 11.5-an improvement of 3.5%.
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adjudication of civil disputes at a price within reach. If the study of
procedural reform is to be directed toward satisfying that interest, it
has no alternative to taking the functional or instrumental approach.
In that direction, "the minimum standards" have no claim to idealistic
perfection. They are purely utilitarian and seek only to solve the most
urgent of the immediate practical problems which stand in the way of
the administration of justice.37 As to the federal rules, and their tendency to facilitate prompt adjudication, it has been said: "In many ...
states the federal rules are kindergarten stuff as compared to the complex
• . . ."38
l ocal practices.
What nicer thing could be said of a procedure--a pure facility or
instrument-than that it is simple and readily understandable? Then
why did Wyoming, for instance, balk at adoption of rule 51? The
reports, it is to be seen, came back from there that the lawyers objected
to "trying to force federal procedure on the state"; they felt that the
"present system is good enough," and that change would "disturb state
judicial precedent." As to the minimum standards it was said that
many were not applicable--that they apply only to overcrowded, metropolitan centers of population.39
In the following discussion of the facts as to adequacy of instructions to the jury the states will be considered in groups which range
from the newest and least densely populated back to the older and most
crowded. After a number of experiments, it was found that the grouping of states by federal circuits, arranged in the inverse order of federal
circuits, showed the most significant contrasts and comparisons. It
will be seen that the circuit groups are not ideal, but at least they show
how the new grades off into systems which retain more of the pioneer
restrictions in the central circuits, and how the latter in tum fade off
into the colonial practice which retains very much indeed of the common law. Thus the state groups commence with the six states of the
mountains and plains in the Tenth Circuit, followed by the west coast
states in the Ninth, and so on.
37VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS 01' JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION xxi (1949).
SB Christopher in 32 N.C.L. REv. 261 at 262 (1954) reviewing VANDERBILT, CAsEs
AND 0rHER MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1954).
39 Kennedy, "The Wyoming Practice and Procedure Act," 2 WYo. L.J. 11 at 13

(1947).
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STATES

Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico
In this the youngest and most sparsely populated group of states, it
does not take more than six months to get to trial (herein taken as "par")
from the time a jury case is at issue, except in certain counties of
Kansas, Wyoming and Utah. The longest such delay is in Wichita>
Kansas, where 8.8 months is needed. (This interval will herein be
called docket time. 40 ) All are code states, yet procedure is now regulated by supreme court rules in Colorado, Utah and New Mexico and>
to lesser extent, in Wyoming. 41
Instructions precede :6nal arguments of counsel in every one of these
states, and written instructions are the rule. 42 Insofar as waiver is permissible and seems to be used to any extent, such fact will be mentioned
in connection with the particular states. The court neither summarizes
nor comments in any of these states except New Mexico. Although
strictly forbidden in Oklahoma and Colorado, summary or recapitulation of the evidence is doubly impracticable in these states, since it must
be given in writing and must avoid any tinge of comment. 48

Oklahoma. Upon turning to the map printed herein, which seeks
to compare adequacy-of-the-charge factors in the various states, one
:6nds Oklahoma shown in black. It is considered a trouble spot in view
of the frequency of reversals on instructions and constant recurrence of
the statement that "the trial court failed to give instructions to the jury
40 All ngures of this kind are from the 1954 Calendar Status Study, note 35 supra.
In Cheyenne, Wyoming, the docket time (in jmy cases, of course) is 7 months. In Salt
Lake City it is 8 months.
41 Since each circuit group will be prefaced by some reference to code adoptions, it is
mentioned that of the references most frequently cited herein, the following contain collections of information as to such enactments: CLARK, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., 24 (1947);
CLARK, CASES ON MoDERN PLEADING 22, n. 13 (1952); MrLLAlt, CIVIL PROCEDURE oF
nm TRIAL CotmT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 54 (1952); VANDERBILT, MmrMuM
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL .ADMINISTRATION 91-145 (in connection with Rule-Making)
(1949). Hereinafter such listings will not be repeated. As to the regulation of procedure
by supreme court rules, discussion and annotation will be deferred to the individual state
discussions unless some preliminary point is to be made.
42 Insofar as these matters of mechanics are not discussed in the separate state discussions which follow, it may be understood that there has been no change in the states'
practices in these respects as tabulated and illustrated in V ANDERllILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JuDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 231-233 (1949), and discussed in MrLLAR, CIVIL
PROCEDURE OF nm TRIAL CotmT IN HisTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 310-315 (1952).
48 See generally the predecessor articles cited in notes 4 and 8 supra.
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on applicable fundamental law of the case and the cause must be
reversed. . . ."44
The duty of the court seems to have been set sky high, although
there are few references to any corresponding duty of counsel. There
seems to be little enforcement of any requirements as to objections.45

Kansas. With some hesitancy Kansas was placed with Wyoming
and Colorado in the dark-ruled or unsatisfactory group. Here it is first
necessary to point out that these estimates have nothing to do with
criminal procedure, where the duty to charge is ordinarily higher than
on the civil side for fairly obvious reasons.46 In Kansas, for instance,
the responsibility of the court for completeness of the criminal charge
is markedly higher than that for the civil.47
This state is rather borderline, in that the balance of responsibility
between court and counsel is not unreasonable as to adequacy of the
charge.48 In practice the system does not seem to cause difficulties as
to reversals on instructions to the degree seen in the neighboring states.49
On the other hand, there is complete absence of the majority of features
taken here to promote adequacy except the permissive use of oral
instruction.

Colorado. Instructions in Colorado are given entirely in writing,
without deviation from the form in which submitted by, counsel.6°
While the duty of the court as to adequacy of the charge is low, the
power and accompanying freedom from responsibility is high.51 In
4 4 Union Transp. Co. v. Mitchell, 203 Okla. 247, 219 P. (2d) 1015 (1950); Evlo
Refining & Marketing Co. v. Moore, 192 Okla. 576, 137 P. (2d) 911 (1943); Beams v.
Young, 92 Okla. 294 at 295, 222 P. 952 (1923). Cases collected Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937)
tit. 12, §577.
45 Taylor v. Hayes, (Okla. 1953) 261 P. (2d) 599; Thompson v. Galion Iron Works,
201 Okla. 182, 203 P. (2d) 438 (1949); Petty v. Frank, 194 Okla. 382, 151 P. (2d) 926
(1943); Riser v. Herr, 187 Okla. 211, 102 P. (2d) 178 (1940).
46 For challenge to validity of this distinction, however, see note 23 MICH. L. Rnv.
276 at 278 (1925).
47 State v. Fouts, 169 Kan. 686, 221 P. (2d) 841 (1950); Baker v. West. Cas. & Sur.
Co., 164 Kan. 376, 190 P. (2d) 850 (1948).
48 Sams v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 157 Kan. 278, 139 P. (2d) 859 (1943);
Hamilton v. A.T. & S.F. R. Co., 95 Kan. 353 at 357, 148 P. 648 (1915); Douglass v.
Geller, 32 Kan. 499 at 501, 4 P. 1039 (1884).
491954 WAsH. UNIV. L.Q. 186-187, specifically, n. 69. Contrast the situations revealed
herein as to Oklahoma, Missouri, or Nebraska.
50 See 27 TEMPLB L.Q. at 151-153, nn. 82-88 (1953). 1 Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953)
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 51. See also rule 46.
51 Under the 1941 "restoration" of prior practice, rule 51 (effective April 6, 1941)
leaves the Colorado practice seen in the following earlier cases unchanged: Gilligan v.
Blakesley, 93 Colo. 370, 26 P. (2d) 808 (1933); Blanchard v. People, 74 Colo. 431, 222
P. 649 (1924).
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general the system is modeled after those of Illinois and Missouri, and
its worst fault is that there is an absence of features designed to make
the instructions useful to the jury.

Wyoming. Although the population of Wyoming has grown at
about the national average, the state total is less than that of Toledo,
Ohio. The 1953 report of eleven months docket delay in Laramie
County (Cheyenne) has been reduced to seven months as of the 1954
report. It is nevertheless noticeable in view of the opinions quoted
earlier to the effect that the present procedure seems good enough to
the practitioners there.52 As to the court's responsibility for completeness of instructions, it is low but not nonexistent.53 General exceptions suffice. 154 The code provisions govern, being taken from Ohio's
version of the Field Code, and inspection thereof will show that there
is room for improvement.1515

Utah. This state's version of federal rule 51 is largely prior state
code practice, but in other respects Utah is rated high in the surveys
as to degree of compliance with the minimum standards and has adopted
many of the federal rules. 56 State-by-state adoption of the federal rules
is in large part a process of borrowing the experience of neighboring
states. The nearby state of Colorado had an unfortunate experience in
1930 when it attempted to make an abrupt change to the federal-style
rule.157 The writer had accordingly assumed that the Colorado experience in adopting a new system before the time was ripe had discouraged
change in Utah-especially since there was evidence that the Colorado
viewpoint had been disseminated in Utah.58 More recently, however,
one who participated in the Utah rule-making process has indicated
to the writer a differing opinion: that the rejection of the change to the
giving of instructions a~er closing arguments of counsel persuaded
the committee that it would be fruitless to press for change of a
more drastic nature. That is, it was at least premature to consider that
52 Note
15 3 State

39 supra.
v. Catellier, 63 Wyo. 123 at 173, 179 P. (2d) 203 (1947); Chicago & N.W.
Ry. v. Ott, 33 Wyo. 200 at 218, 237 P. 238 (1925). See discussion of earlier cases in
1954 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 185, esp. nn. 52, 53.
54 Wallace v. Skinner, 15 Wyo. 233, 88 P. 221 (1907).
55 Wyo. Stat. Ann. (1945) §3-2408.
56 Elliott, "Judicial Administration," 1953 AmrnAL SURVEY OF AMEmcAN LAw 814.
57 Kollanan v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931). See 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 151 for
discussion of this debacle.
58 See, e.g., remarks by a draftsman of Utah rules, 24 lDAHo S.B.A. PRoC:BEDINGS 36
(1950); 27 T:BMPL:B L.Q. 152 (1953).
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feature which is implicit, although not express, in rule 51, the judicial
power to give an unrestricted summing up. If Utah was influenced by
the Colorado experience, said the speaker, the influence was an unconscious one.
More related to the present question is the circumstance that the
court is held to at least a median responsibility for instructions, while
objections of counsel must be specific.59 The general pattern of procedure is progressive and tips the scales to justify Utah's inclusion in the
faint-ruled rating.

New Mexico. While New Mexico spells the comment power out
in terms in its version of rule 51, it has nevertheless adapted that rule
to provide that instruction precede argument. 60 Instructions must furthermore be written, although waiver of that requirement is permissible.
It is likely that the written instructions serve a special purpose in this
somewhat bilingual area. 61 Notice should also be taken of the 28 percent population increase and the fact that the docket time is nevertheless
not over the par of six months. This state, one of the ten smallest in
terms of population, is of special interest in that it may be considered a
laboratory for study of federal rule adaptation to state practice. 62 New
Mexico has pioneered in making the rule in question control criminal
as well as civil procedure. 63
The trouble spot in this group is the one state which is losing population, Oklahoma. The two states which have made the best adaptations, however, Utah and New Mexico, have population increases of
almost twice the 15 percent national average. That circumstance suggests a tentative hypothesis that the factor of growth bears relation to
progressiveness in procedure. At least, this seems tentatively plausible
59 Startin v. Madsen, (Utah 1951) 237 P. (2d) 834 at 836; Fowler v. Medical Arts
Bldg., 112 Utah 367 at 377, 188 P. (2d) 711 (1948).
6DRules of the District Courts of the State of New Mexico Adopted May 23, "1949,
Effective Dec. 31, 1949: Rule 51; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §21-1-1(51). The original
fonn of this rule was enabled per N.M. Laws (1933) c. 84 and adopted eff. July 1, 1934.
See generally State v. Ochoa, 41 N.M. 589, 72 P. (2d) 609 (1937); 27 TEMPLB L.Q. 147.
61 Leonardo v. Terr. of New Mexico, 1 N.M. 291 (1859).
62 The Per Curiam foreword to the Pamphlet Edition of the Rules commences: "Adhering to its established policy of promulgating rules of civil procedure for district courts
of New Mexico which conform, as nearly as practicable, to Rules of Civil Procedure for
District Courts of the United States, the following rules are adopted." (West Pub. Co.
1949).
63 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §41-11-10 to §41-11-16, "now included in the Rules of
Practice for the Dist. Cts., Rule 51." Frei v. Brownlee, 56 N.M. 677, 248 P. (2d) 671
(1952); Lujan v. McCuistion, 55 N.M. 275, 232 P. (2d) 478 (1951); State v. Trujillo,
54 N.M. 307, 224 P. (2d) 151 (1950).
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in the case of these young states which have not yet become "set in
their ways." In this group the growing states, which are the ones which
have turned to rule-making and the federal rules, seem to be the ones
most ready and able to adapt.

NINTH Cm.cuIT

STATES

Idaho, Montana, Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, Nevada
The average "age" of these states is eleven years greater than that
of the preceding group. The average rank in population is only slightly
higher-but the extremes as to density of population are great, since
California is second in population rank of the states whereas Nevada
is 48th. 64 Docket delay is now over par only in California and Oregon.
The average of the population increase between the 1940 and 1950
census in these seven states is a surprising 35 percent.
All are code states, although Arizona and Nevada have achieved
full rule-making and have adapted the federal rules. In Idaho and
Washington, procedure is regulated by rules, and there is some rulemaking in California.
Instructions are given at the approved time except in Washington,
Idaho and Montana. 65 Instructions are usually written except in Oregon. The court does not have the common law power of comment, and
does not summarize, anywhere except California.

Idaho. The Idaho statute (now made rule of court) is a constellation of separate provisions taken from here and there. 66 There is little
burden on the court as to adequacy of instructions, whereas counsel
must ask for instructions, even to such fundamentals as the measure of
64 "Age" averages refer simply to average date of admission to statehood. Population
data is based on the 1950 figures of the United States Bureau of the Census. Figures as to
percent of population increase are based on tables in current almanacs or Statistics of the
States as set out in the familiar LAWYEn's DIARY (West 1953).
65 "Approved time" herein means after closing arguments of counsel, in accordance
with the minimum standards of trial practice (2). In Idaho, instructions are given before
closing arguments in civil (but not criminal) cases. In Nevada, instructions preceded argument until adoption of the 1953 rules.
66 Idaho Code Ann. (1947) §§10-206(4),(6),(7), 10-207, 10-208, 10-213. See
Comparative Legislation Note, Idaho Code Ann. showing the Calif., Mont., N.D., and
Utah :inB.uences. By order of Idaho Supreme Court, March 19, 1951, these sections have
been made rules of practice for the courts of Idaho. The writer was advised by an Idaho
lawyer in August 1954 that the exact status of these rules had not at that time been
defined (from the bar's standpoint, i.e.).
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damages, if the jury is to be instructed. Counsel apparently need not
give reasons for objections to the giving or refusing of instructions. 67

Montana. The Montana code is less involved, being a pure presettlement system like that of Colorado. 68 The statute is of the type
whereby the court is to instruct on such matters as it "thinks necessary."69 The statute calls for specific objections. The cases have held
that failure to submit a request does not bar the right to object to failure
to instruct on a matter, so long as the jury has not retired and the
circumstances justify.70
Responsibility between court and counsel is thus not especially
unbalanced, but one notes that there are none of the approved features
of mechanics present, and no plus factors making for adequacy of
instruction. Mere equilibrium between the duties of court and counsel
is not enough. In any event, extreme restrictiveness as to anything
bordering on comment, added to the other features, makes the darkruled classification justifiable.71
Washington. It is superficially difficult to justify showing Washington faint-ruled, since most of the undesirable features of the Idaho
and Montana mechanics are present here.72 It must be considered,
however, that despite 37 percent growth the dockets are practically
current, rule-making is in progress and a sort of retooling in the direction of the federal rules is afoot. 73 No change as to the rules concerning instructions has as yet appeared, however. Recent decisions have
pronounced some very salutary rules which tend to make the best of
a system which basically leans toward. ineffective instruction. For instance, the discretion of the trial court was clearly honored in August
of 1953;74 the distinctions between misdirection and nondirection were
67Ryska v. Anderson, 70 Idaho 207, 214 P. (2d) 874 (1950); Pittman v. Sather, 68
Idaho 29, 188 P. (2d) 600 (1947); Dawson v. Salt Lake Hdw. Co., 64 Idaho 666, 136
P. (2d) 733 (1943); Owen v. Taylor, 62 Idaho 408, 114 P. (2d) 258 (1941); Boomer v.
Isley, 49 Idaho 666, 290 P. 405 (1930).
68 Mont. Rev. Code (1947) §93-5101(5).
69 Id., §93-5101(6).
70 Whitney v. Northwest Greyhound Lines, Inc., 125 Mont. 528, 242 P. (2d) 257
(1952). VANDERBILT, :MmlMUM STANDAllDS OF JUDICIAL AM:mxsTB.ATION 230, n. 11
(1949).
71 Murray v. Butte, 51 Mont. 258, 151 P. 1051 (1915); McShane v. Kenkle, 18 Mont.
208, 44 P. 979 (1896).
12 I.e., written instructions given before closing arguments; summary and comment
forbidden.
73 See Rules of the Superior Courts, esp. rule 8, published as vol. 34a of Washington
reports, second series (1951). See VANDERBILT, lvhNIMuM STANDABDs OF JUDICIAL .ADMINISTRATION 126, n. 135 (1949) for the background of this development.
74Adkisson v. Seattle, 42 Wash. (2d) 676, 258 P. (2d) 461 (1953).
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well restated in the recent Kegeler's case;75 and the rule that an incorrect request may nevertheless suffice to raise a duty to charge on the
part of the court is seen in cases from time to time. 76 This latter rule,
herein called the sufficient-to-suggest principle, was well displayed in
an interpretation of federal rule 51 by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in 1951.77
The provision of the Washington constitution, being of the Tennessee type, restricts the charge to "law," but it nevertheless requires
the court to declare the law.78 It has been held in Washington to state
a duty of the court to instruct on basic matters regardless of request,
but has not been given any such unreasonable interpretation that requires instruction on "all the law" sua sponte.79

Oregon. Following California in this respect, Oregon has a code
provision which lists the basic matters upon which the court must
instruct in a proper case.80 An interesting application is seen in a 1944
malpractice action where the plaintiff simply filed a request for "usual
statutory instructions." Denying the efficacy of that dragnet request,
the supreme court said:
''The trial judge, no matter how competent and learned he
may be, is not as a rule clairvoyant. He is not expected to divine
counsel's unexpressed thoughts about the law nor to speculate
upon the meaning of a cryptic request for instruction such as that
under consideration. . . . A practice which would permit error to
be predicated upon the refusal of such a request, or some portion
of it, could well prove a trap both for the court and the opposing
party."s1
The extent to which some of the best features of the traditional
common law charge, such as orality, are sought to be maintained in a
rather restrictive background are described in some detail in a readily
accessible address by Justice Rossman of the Oregon Supreme Court.82
75 Heitfeld v. Benevolent and Protective Order of Keglers, 36 Wash. (2d) 685, 220
P. (2d) 655 (1950).
76 Kennett v. Yates, 41 Wash. (2d) 558, 250 P. (2d) 962 (1952).
77 Montgomery v. Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., (D.C. Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 770.
78WAsH. CoNsT., art. IV, §16. Burgin v. Universal Credit Co., 2 Wash. (2d) 364,
98 P. (2d) 291 (1940); State v. Walters, 7 Wash. 246, 34 P. 938 (1893); MonGAN, THE
LAw oF EVIDENCE 14 (1927).
79 Thompson v. Seattle, 42 Wash. (2d) 53, 253 P. (2d) 625 (1953); Groeschell v.
Washington Chocolate Co., 128 Wash. 589, 224 P. 19 (1924); Hiscock v. Phinney, 81
Wash. 117, 142 P. 461 (1914).
so Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §17.210 (I) through (7).
SI Hotelling v. Walther, 174 Ore. 381 at 388, 148 P. (2d) 933 (1944).
S2Rossman, ''The Judge-Jury Relationship in the State Courts," 3 F.R.D. 98 (1942).
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California. Judges in California were given freedom by constitutional and statutory changes which commenced in 1934.83 Apart from
the statutory charges, heretofore described as to Oregon, the basic duty
to charge is kept low, but counsel is given a reasonable share of responsibility.84 Despite a 53 percent population increase, the dockets are
not hopelessly bogged down, although there is a lag of almost a year in
Los Angeles and San Diego.
Arizona. This state, which grew 50 percent between the 1940 and
1950 census, reports its dockets current. Arizona was the first of the
states to adopt the federal rules, which became effective in 1940.85
The judge does not have the common law powers, however, and the
constitution has a provision that assumption of the risk and contributory negligence are always for the jury.86
Arizona is most notable in that it is the first, and almost the only
state to change the time of instruction from before argument back to
the approved order, once the "southwest style" had become entrenched. 87 Furthermore, prior to the 1940 rules, the cases showed
reversals for failure to instruct despite request or objection-and it was
evident that counsel was not being required to carry its share of the
load.88 The provisions of rule 51 ameliorate that problem.

Nevada. A state with a 45 percent population increase, Nevada
adopted the federal rules effective January l, 1953.89 It is significant
83 CAL. CONST., art. VI, §19, as amended, Nov. 6, 1934. For details see 27 TEMPLB
L.Q. 145-147.
84 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1953) §2061. State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v.
Siliznoff, 38 Cal. (2d) 330 at 340, 240 P. (2d) 282 (1952); Fortier Transp. Co. v. Union
Packing Co., 96 Cal. App. (2d) 748 at 756, 216 P. (2d) 470 (1950).
85 Sunderland, "Arizona's New Rules of Civil Procedure Effect Conformity with
Federal Rules," 23 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 215 (1940); Lockwood, "Arizona Uses Federal Court
Practice as Model," 26 A.B.A.J. 413 (1940). Burney v. Lee, 59 Ariz. 360, 129 P. (2d)
308 (1942).
86 Amz. CoNsT., art. 6, §12 and art. 18, §5. Security Benefit Assn. v. Small, 34 Ariz.
458 at 467, 272 P. 647 (1928); Pearson & Dickerson, Inc. v. Harrington, 60 Ariz. 354 at
364, 137 P. (2d) 381 (1943); Herron v. So. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 53 S.Ct. 383 (1931).
87 See RuLEs OF THE SOPRBME COURT AND RULEs oF CIVIL PROCEDURB FOR THE
SUPERIOR COURTS OF AruzoNA [corrected] effective April 1, 1950 (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1950).
Rule 51 therein appears to be federal rule 51 almost verbatim. See Compiler's Notes therein
to the effect that it supersedes Ariz. Code §§21-1017 and following, which provided that
instructions precede the argument. Note that of the other states which have to some extent
adopted federal rule 51, there is none (except Arizona) other than Nevada (see infra)
which has made even a partial step toward changing the order of trial in this respect.
88 Under present law: Schmerfeld v. Hendry, 74 Ariz. 159, 245 P. (2d) 420 (1952);
Valley Transportation System v. Reinartz, 67 Ariz. 380, 197 P. (2d) 269 (1948). Under
prior law: Southwest Cotton Co. v. Ryan, 22 Ariz. 520, 199 P. 124 (1921); Curry v.
Windsor, 22 Ariz. 108, 194 P. 958 (1921).
89 Nev. Rules Civ. Proc., as adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court. See generally
1954 WASH. Umv. L.Q. 186, nn. 59-64.
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that the time of instruction has been allowed to stand as in the federal
rule, i.e., after arguments. That makes a change as to the prior Nevada
practice although a compromise proviso has been inserted permitting
counsel to require, by specific request, that the charge precede arguments.90
While these seven states demonstrate what Millar has called the
"disfigurements which common law jury trial has undergone," 01 a
trend toward reconstruction is clearly apparent in the fastest-growing
five of this group of seven states.92
EIGHTH

CmcmT STATES

Missouri, Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota, Arkansas, North Dakota,
South Dakota
The growth of population factor is not of special significance as
to this group, since all seven are in that respect substantially below the
national average.93 Two states, at opposite ends of this block, North
Dakota and Arkansas, have actually registered net losses.94 In many
respects these truly central states are representative or average, of course.
For instance, the geographical center of the country lies near the
junction of three of its states; the average date of admission of this
group is 1865, and the average population rank of the states is twentyeighth.
Considerable spread as to degrees of success in coping with the
adequacy problem is exhibited on the appended map. The trouble
spots, Missouri and Nebraska, will be considered first since they afford
a significant contrast. First, however, some overall similarities may be
collected. Docket delay seems to be localized to certain centers in
three of these states, Kansas City and St. Louis in Missouri, Minne90 The inserted proviso in rule 51 is shown in italics in the following passage: " •••
but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed; pr011ided, if either
party demand it the court must settle and give the instructions to the jury before the
argument begins, but this shall not prevent the giving of further instructions which may
become necessary by reason of the argument. . • ."
91 MILLAR, CIVIL PnoCBDURE OF THB TRIAL CoURT IN HrsToruCAL PERSPEcnvE
314 (1952).
92 I.e., Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona and Nevada-of which group the
average increase of population from 1940 to 1950 was 45%. The average of the population increase in the two states in which substantial progress is not discerned, Idaho and
Montana, is 9%-being 6% less than the national average of 15%.
93 Average of this 7-state group is 2%, whereas national increase 1940-1950 is 15%.
94 N.D., -3.5%; Ark., -2.0%.
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apolis and St. Paul in Minnesota, and Fargo, North Dakota.95 These
are all code states, although rule-making as to procedure (more or less
subject to the legislature) has become functional in Missouri, Iowa,
Minnesota, and South Dakota.
Written instructions are contemplated almost everywhere, except
(to an extent) Arkansas and Minnesota. The latter is also the only
state in which there is not a strict ban on comment on the evidence.
Instructions in civil cases come at the approved time, after argument,
in the majority, but precede in Missouri, Arkansas and South Dakota.
Presettlement of instructions is certainly the rule in Iowa, Missouri,
and the Dakotas and is used to some extent in the other three. Apart
from Iowa and Minnesota the general practice is to read the accepted
requests in no particular order. Iowa and Minnesota encourage the
court to weave requests into an organized series. Differences begin
when one compares Missouri and Nebraska, for instance.
Missouri. When a complaint was made that the trial court had
not given sufficient instruction in a case arising a half-century ago, the
Missouri Supreme Court answered (in a literary style which many
will recognize):
"It has not hitherto been allowed to the nisi prius judge-a
puisne judge-to have been so successful in 'mastering the lawless
science of our law' . . . that he has the whole body of the law
at his :fingers' ends, so to speak, for instantaneous and automatic
application, ex mero motu, without having his attention directed
by counsel to some specific legal principle. . . . Only appellate
courts . . . are so endowed, and even this . . . should be . . .
taken cum grano salis."96
As late as 1912 the second edition of Thompson on Trials was
making a similar assertion in the form of a Hat statement that no court
has any enforceable duty to charge on any point not suggested by
counsel.97 Such statement was not true in general at that time;98 the
treatise cited. for the most part only early cases, carried forward from
the earlier edition of the 1880's.99 Those cases were from the states
95 St. Louis, 9 months; Kansas City, 24 months; Minneapolis, 12 months; St. Paul,
10 months; Cass County, N.D. (Fargo), 7 months.
96 Lamm, J., speaking for the court in Bragg v. Metropolitan Street Ry., 192 Mo. 331
at 345, 91 S.W. 527 (1905).
97 2 THOMPSON ON TRIALs, 2d ed., §2338 (1912).
98 The opposite rule, high sua sponte duty, had gained a strong foothold by the 1880's,
as may be apparent from the discussions of Iowa and Nebraska to follow.
99 The fust edition of THOMPSON ON TRIALS was 1889. The second (note 97 supra)
cites (apart from Missouri cases): Coates v. Sangston, 5 Md. 121 (1853); Haupt v. Pohl-
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that followed this laissez-faire doctrine, such as Virginia, Illinois·, and
Missouri, but the rule had meanwhile changed elsewhere. At any
rate, however, such was the Missouri rule for perhaps thirty years after
the colorful words just quoted were spoken.10° Currently, a local knowhow book says with commendable restraint:
"Under Missouri practice the parties have the duty of preparing instructions in civil cases. These are of extreme importance
and there are many, many reversals because of errors in instructions. . . ."101
Counsel finally hit upon the expedient, to avert such reversals, of
privately agreeing to submit no instructions. By 1934 it became necessary, in the view of the Missouri Supreme Court, to call a halt to that
widespread custom, and it posted a warning that counsel would thereafter be required by the trial court to submit instructions as condition
precedent to the submission of their case to the jury.102 The rule now
current is that non-direction raises a prima facie presumption of error;
it constitutes reversible error if the facts are so complicated as to warrant
an instruction and if prejudice results to a party.103
From the foregoing, and in conjunction with the rule stated earlier
that a general objection suffices here, it is apparent that balance has not
been struck as to the duties of court and counsel. Missouri has gone
forward in many respects as to procedure and is famous for its pioneering plan for judicial selection.104 The fact remains, however, that the
present sanctions as to instructions could not produce much more than
a token showing of instruction were counsel minded to keep instructions to a minimum.

Nebraska. This state has gone to the other extreme, and enforces
an unreas.onably high-duty rule-such as that exhibited in the earlier
mann, 16 Abb. Pr. (N.Y.) 301 at 307 (1863); Taylor v. Barnett, 39 Colo. 469, 90 P. 74
(1907). See also §2341, which enlarges the rule that specific instructions must be asked
for by assimilating the present question to the latter.
100 I.e., from the opinion of Judge Lamm, note 96 supra, down to the Dorman case
in 1934, note 102 infra.
1011 VoLz, et al., Mi:ssoURI PRAC'IlCB §1582, p. 761 (1953). Instructions to the
Jury is the title of a course given at the University of Kansas City School of Law, incidentally.
102 Dorman v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 335 Mo. 1082 at 1086, 75 S.W. (2d) 854
(1934). See also 1954 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 180-182.
103Yerger v. Smith, 338 Mo. 140, 89 S.W. (2d) 66 (1935); Arnold v. May Dept.
Stores, 337 Mo. 727 at 739, 85 S.W. (2d) 748 (1935); Sherman Investment Co. v.
Sheehan, (Mo. App. 1947) 199 S.W. (2d) 922, 927. Note, 1 Mo. L. Rav. 208 (1936).
104 ''The [judicial selection] plan approved by the American Bar Association has been
adopted only in Missouri." VANDERBILT, MmrMuM STANDARDS oF JUDICIAL .AnMINIS·
TRAnON 5 (1949).
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discussion of Oklahoma. It is black on the map simply because there are
entirely too many preventable appeals on the score of inadequate instruction. Yet the court's duty is stated unequivocally:
"We have often said, and it needs no citation of authority,
that it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury upon the issues
presented by the pleadings and evidence whether requested to do
so or not."106
·
Why is it necessary for the supreme court to repeat and repeat that
formula? One answer is that it is provided by statute that "exception
to the giving or refusal of instructions may be without any stated reason
therefor."106 Another is that in 1948 it was held that a shotgun assignment of error to a group of twenty-four instructions suffices to raise
error as to each.107 While the latter decision, which simply confirmed
an existing practice, goes only to errors of commission, it cumulates
the evidence that the duty of the trial court is in no sense balanced
by a reciprocal duty on the part of counsel. The result, which may
be seen for oneself by paging through a few volumes of the reports,
is inevitable.
Iowa. An almost similar situation existed in Iowa prior to 1944.
Reference to the Iowa cases can be quite misleading in that respect,
in that reversal after reversal on instructions are readily found.108 If
one does not observe the dates and note that the very great bulk of
those cases are under prior law, he may form the incorrect impression
formerly held by the writer.109 Further study shows, however, that the
1944 rules make the very best of a restricted system of instructing.110
Objections of counsel to the court's draft instructions must be specific
and timely.111 The comments of the Rules Advisory Committee are
more revealing than anything the writer could say:
105 Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196 at 207, 55 N.W. (2d) 643 (1952); York
Park Bldg. Assn. v. Barnes, 39 Neb. 834, 58 N.W. 440 (1894); Sandwich Mfg. Co. v.
Shiley, 15 Neb. 109, 17 N.W. 267 (1883). See generally 1954 WASH. UNiv. L.Q. 187.
106Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §25-1114.
101 Klause v. Neb. State Board of Agriculture, 150 Neb. 466, 35 N.W. (2d) 104
(1948), noted in 28 N:sn. L. REv. 452 (1949).
10s E.g., Gardner v. Johnson, 231 Iowa 1233, 3 N.W. (2d) 606 (1942), and so on
back to Owen v. Owen, 22 Iowa 270 (1867).
1001954 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 189-190, esp. nn. 85 and 86.
110 Dean Mason Ladd, of the University of Iowa College of Law wrote: ''While a
good deal of objection can be urged to the type of instructions we give, actually the process
may work fairly well. • • • In my own experience • • • I felt that much depended on the
trial judge as to their effectiveness••••" Letter dated September 1, 1954.
lllRule 196, 58 Iowa Code Ann. (1951) Rules of Civil Procedure. See Nicols v.
Kirchner, 241 Iowa 99, 40 N.W. (2d) 13, and cases collected therein. For contrast, notice
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"... It was the tendency of all lawyers heretofore to refrain from
calling the attention of the court to any errors in instructions until
such questions were raised on a motion for a new trial. As a result
of this many cases were reversed in the Supreme Court due to
errors in instructions, which errors would have been cured in the
lower court had the same been called to the attention of the lower
court."
''This Rule aims to restore Instructions to their proper function:
to enlighten the jury as to the law which they are to apply to the
facts; and not to trap a hurried and harried trial judge. If counsel
cannot see anything wrong with the court's final draft, when he
reads it, a jury is not likely to be misled by it."112
Minnesota. The adoption of the Federal Rules in 1952 made no
drastic change as to the matter at hand, in Minnesota.113 It has long
been the rule that although "afterthought is better than none at all,"114
it takes an omission on a more-than-ordinary matter to make it mandatory upon the court to initiate an instruction not requested.111' Furthermore, counsel must make their objections pointed, and in due time.
Thus-"Those who have business before the court have a right to
expect that their affairs will be disposed of promptly and pursuant to
law which treats one as it does another."116
Arkansas. Although Arkansas belongs under Missouri, discussion
was postponed in order to present the Missouri-Nebraska contrast. In
Thordson v. McKeighan, 235 Iowa 409, 16 N.W. (2d) 607 (1944), being one of the last
cases under the code, and before July 4, 1943 the effective date of the rules which superseded the code as to procedure generally, and specifically Iowa Code (1939) §§11491-5.
112 CooK, lowA RuLES OF CIVIL PnocEDURE, rev. ed. (1951). The first quoted paragraph is from Advisory Committee Comment to Rule 196, p. 358; the second paragraph is
from Author's Comment, p. 359.
113 Minn. Rules of Civ. Proc. for the District Cts., eff. Jan. 1, 1952. Professor David
W. Louisell of the University of Minnesota Law School wrote: "I do not think the adoption of Rule 51 has changed the practice or the attitude of lawyers toward instructing juries
appreciably. Perhaps, however, since the new Rules there is more tendency to use the
special verdict, or interrogatories to accompany general verdict, which tends to change
instructions somewhat••.." Letter dated September 11, 1953.
114 " ••• no exceptions were taken, nor was any suggestion made of any error in the
court's charge. Not until the motion for new trial was made was the sentence mentioned
thought to be erroneous. It was then bodily lifted out of its context in the hope that even
an afterthought is better than none at all." Timm v. Schneider, 203 Minn. 1 at 8, 279 N.W.
754 (1938).
115 Chapman v. Dorsey, 235 Minn. 25, 49 N.W. (2d) 4 (1951); Foster v. Bock, 229
Minn. 428 at 432, 39 N.W. (2d) 862 (1949). See MAsoN's DUNNELL MINN. Die., 3d
ed., §375 (1953) for other cases.
116 Timm v. Schneider, 203 Minn. l at 8, 279 N.W. 754 (1938). Generally as to
Minnesota, see 1954 WASH, Umv. L.Q. 200-201.
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Arkansas instructions are a privilege; counsel must request them.117
On the other hand, objections must not be blind.118 The threshold of
fundamental error is rather high.119 The system contains much of
Illinois and Missouri philosophy as to instructions, but has some ameliorations which may come from Tennessee.120
North Dakota; South Dakota. Presettlement of instructions is the
characteristic of the Dakotas.121 North Dakota is only now coming
around to rule-making, however, although South Dakota made a considerable change under new rules in 1939.122
In North Dakota the judicial duty has run the gamut from a stringent duty like that seen in Nebraska to something more in the Missouri
direction since. In general, power of the court is low, and responsibility of counsel is not high.123 The attitude of the reviewing courts
has been one of considerable technicality as was recently shown in a
rather comprehensive law review note which collected many North
Dakota cases.124
In South Dakota there was a plethora of cases on instructions prior
to 1939, but since the inception of the new rules in that year, a decrease
is apparent.125 The change is of the order of that hitherto seen in Iowa
117Kyles v. State, 143 Ark. 419 at 421, 220 S.W. 458 (1920); Hutcheson v. Clapp,
216 Ark. 517 at 524, 226 S.W. (2d) 546 (1950). Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §27-1727.
118 Peterson v. Jackson, 193 Ark. 880 at 883, 103 S.W. (2d) 640 (1937).
119 Failure to charge the jury as to the crime of manslaughter and the difference
between that crime and murder held not reversible error in the absence of proper request:
Martin v. State, 189 Ark. 408, 72 S.W. (2d) 539 (1934); McCuistion v. State, 213 Ark.
879, 213 S.W. (2d) 619 (1948).
120E.g., Crain v. St. Louis R. Co., 206 Ark. 465 at 469, 176 S.W. (2d) 145 (1943).
See generally, Leflar, "Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration-Arkansas," 5 ARK.
L. Rav. l at 7 (1950); note, 5 ARK. L. Rav. 88 (1950).
121 See Curry, ''Instructions to Jury-Groundwork for Review," 1952 Wrs. L. Rav.
750 at 755, in which the presettlement plan of the Dakotas is commended.
122 As to North Dakota: VANDEBl!ILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS 01' JUDICIAL ADMINisTRATION 120 (1949); N.D. Laws (1953) c. 201 amends N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §27-0211:
"Notice of Intention to Promulgate Rule." As to South Dakota: 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 155 esp.
nn. 101-103 (1953).
123 Remington v. Geiszler, 30 N.D. 346 at 348, 152 N.W. 661 (1915); Redahl v.
Stevens, 64 N.D. 154, 250 N.W. 534 (1933); Mann v. Policyholders' Nat. Life Ins. Co.,
78 N.D. 724, 51 N.W. (2d) 853 (1952).
124 Note, 27 N.D. L. Rav. 199 (1951).
125 Under prior law: Wilson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 15 S.D. 322, 89 N.W.
649 (1902); Hustad v. International Oil Co., 52 N.D. 343, 202 N.W. 814 (1925). For
prevalence of such cases see 5 CALLAHAN's SouTH DAKOTA DIGEST, TRIAL, §118 and
following.
Under Supreme Court Rule 146 of 1939, S.D. Code (1939) §33.1317: Kirkegaard
v. Sioux Falls, 69 S.D. 214, 8 N.W. (2d) 862 (1943); ORl'IELD, Cm:Mi:NAL PROCEDURE
FROM ARREsT TO APPEAL 458 (1947).
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and is made against the background of a statute borrowed from Illinois.126 Errors not pointed out are waived under the new rules. The
sterilized instructions under this particular system are not necessarily
very informative, but the calamity of new trial is often averted.
This large circuit reveals the extremes resulting from nineteenth
century devices to restrict the trial court. It has been said that the great
task of reform as to instructions is to save jury trial from its friends. It
was on these plains (and not entirely in North Carolina where restriction started) that jury trial met almost mortal injury at the hands of
its inimical friends. 127 One is reminded of little Abner, and his reply
when asked if he really was going to shoot his pappy: "Better me than
someone who doesn't love him."
SEVENTH

Cmcurr

STATES

Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana

These are all middle-aged states, so to speak, and all are growing
at about the national average rate. Each has a peculiar pattern of distribution as to population, having a few rather congested centers, with
the rest of the particular state consisting of not overpopulated agricultural areas. Indiana has a scattering of good-sized manufacturing centers, however-more like Ohio. Illinois has a tremendous contrast between overcrowded, docket-congested Chicago and the unhurried downstate courts. The dockets picture is thus what might be expected. Chicago, Milwaukee, and one of the larger Indiana centers range--in that
order-from delays of 36 months, 24 months, and then 8 months in
South Bend, Indiana to practically current dockets away from those
cities. Indiana and Wisconsin are old-line code states, but all now have
some judicial rule-making. In Wisconsin and Illinois rule-making is
ancillary to legislation or subject to it; Indiana has full supervisory
rule-making on the part of the supreme court, although its rules incorporate non-conflicting procedural statutes.
Instructions follow closing arguments in these three states. Written
instructions are mandatory in Wisconsin and Illinois. Requests must
be given verbatim if accepted in both these states. Illinois judges confine themselves to reading accepted requests. Today it is probably safe
to say that the word charge has a somewhat unfamiliar sound to lawyers
12a Peart v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 8 S.D. 634, 67 N.W. 837 (1896); St.
Croix Lumber Co. v. Pennington, 2 Dak. 467, 11 N.W. 497 (1881).
12727 TEMPLE L.Q. 140, nn. 17, 18; PoUND, THE SPilUT OF THE CoMMoN LAw 112
(1921).
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of the Seventh Circuit and west thereof. In none of these states does
the court summarize or comment, although he is theoretically empowered to do so in Wisconsin.128

Wisconsin. There is an apocryphal story of an early judge who
said: "I will instruct you in one word: Go!" The court in the well
known case of Stuckey 11. Fritsche was considerably more polite, simply
saying, "I have no charge to give you gentlemen."129 The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin held that there was no judicial duty to instruct in
the absence of request, and such interpretation of the statute has been
frequent since.130
The matter is now somewhat moot, since special verdicts require
or permit no instruction on the law, and Wisconsin uses such almost
exclusively in civil cases.131 The difficulty of special verdicts is the
framing of questions, and even under the streamlined Wisconsin statutory variety, there is some difficulty.132 One wonders whether the special verdict has any possible connection with the 24-month delay in the
Milwaukee dockets.
Illinois. Some of Illinois' difficulties have been twice told in this
very series.133 The present system contemplates the mere reading of
accepted requests of counsel.1 34 Judicial functions are strongly repressed, and counsel's responsibility is low. For instance, specific defects
128 ''Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration in Wisconsin," 1952 Wis. B. BOL.
17, 19; Hoyt, "The Judge's Power to Comment on the Testimony in His Chaxge to the
Juxy," II MARQ. L. REv. 67 at 72 (1927); 1954 WAsH.'Umv. L.Q. 199.
129 77 Wis. 329, 46 N.W. 59 (1890).
,
130 Jorgenson v. Hillestad, 250 Wis. 592, 27 N.W. (2d) 709 (1947); Patterson v.
Edgerton Sand & Gravel Co., 227 Wis. 11, 277 N.W. 636 (1938). BRYANT, WxscoNSIN
PLEADING & PRAcncE, 3d ed., §33.70 (1954). But see Benedict v. Berg, 229 Wis. 1, 281
N.W. 650 (1938); Jenks v. Hetzel, 231 Wis. 243 at 247, 285 N.W. 737 (1939).
131Preface to l REm, BRANSON INsTRucnoNs TO JuRIEs, 3d ed., iii (1936): ''The
use of special verdicts in civil cases has been fast developing, and in some states, notably
Wisconsin, the use is almost universal in civil cases." For strictures against the giving of
general instructions in special verdicts cases see Maxshall, J., for the court in Byington v.
Merrill, ll2 Wis. 2ll, 88 N.W. 26 (1901).
132 Rosenberry, ''Recent Progress in Judicial Procedure and Administration in Wisconsin," 45 A.B.A. REP. 372 (1920); MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL CounT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPEcnvE 320 (1952); Wis. Stat. (1951) §270.28.
133 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 153 (1953); 1954 WAsH. UNIV. L.Q. 184, esp. n. 49.
134ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. II0, §191: "(I) The court shall give instructions to the
jury only in writing and only as to the law of the case. When instructions are asked which
the judge cannot give, he shall, on the margin thereof, write the word 'refused', and such
as he approves he shall write on the margin thereof the word 'given', and he shall in no
case, after instructions axe given, clarify, modify or in any manner explain the same to the
jury, otherwise than in writing.
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in instructions need only be pointed out in the motion for new trialas in the former Iowa practice heretofore described in the words of the
Advisory Committee member.135 Every so often a case refers to the
right of a trial court to instruct of its own motion, but there is no legal
reason why the court should (and several practical reasons why it
should not). 136
A modification very much like that of Iowa's 1944 rules was made
by the initial version of section 67 of the 1933 Civil Practice Act, but
the legislature scrapped the newfangled arrangement in favor of a
return to prior law within eighteen months. 137 There remain in the
books the numerous cases decided during that 18-month interim indicating the extent to which objections to instructions are urged as afterthoughts-since the short-lived section required that objections be
pointed out at a time and in a manner which would permit them to
serve to avoid error in the trial.1 38
Indiana. Early Indiana cases lead a non-Hoosier to suspect there
to be quiddities and quillets in the development of its instructing process which might repay further investigation.139 It is at least clear that
by the 1880's some modicum of general instruction was essential regardless of special requests.140 In that respect the system seemed to
look eastward toward Ohio rather than toward the neighboring state
of Illinois to the west. Adoption of a court rule as to instructions in
135 But see Rall, "Proposed Revision of Civil Practice Act Now Available," 36 Cm.
BAR REc. 29 at 31 (1954): " ••• Under proposed section 67 .•• counsel will be required
to object specifically to erroneous instructions before the jury argument."
130 Power: Muller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 293 ill. App. 555, 13 N.E. (2d) 96
(1938); Chicago v. Moore, 139 ill. 201 at 205, 28 N.E. 1071 (1891); cases collected in
3 NICHOLLS, h.LINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE §3584 (1941). Low duty: Osgood v. Skinner,
lll ill. App. 606, affd. 2ll ill. 229, 71 N.E. 869 (1904); E. B. Conover & Co. v. B. & 0.
S.W.R. Co., 212 ru. App. 29 (1918); NICHOLLS, supra, §3586.
137 ill. Laws (1935) p. 1071, eff. July 1, 1935, amended C.P.A. §67 which was
enacted ill. Laws (1933) p. 784, approved June 23, 1933. Present form as cited note 134
supra.
138These "interim cases" may be seen scattered through vols. 359 through 361 of the
lliinois Reports from People v. Wynekoop, 359 ill. 124 at 131, 194 N.E. 276 (1935), to
People v. D'Andrea, 361 ill. 526 at 535, 198 N.E. 698 (1935). In the ill. App. Reports
they run from Randall Dairy Co. v. Pevely Dairy Co., 278 ill. App. 350 (1935) to Thiel
v. Material Service Corp., 283 ru. App. 46 (1935). See McCASKILL, h.LINOIS CIVIL PRAC•
TICE Ac:r 182 (1936 Supp.): "Decisions under the repealed section are cited without
comment for such informational value as they may have."
139 Welch v. Watts, 9 Ind. 115 at 116 (1857); Provines v. Heaston, 67 Ind. 482 at
484 (1879); Davis v. Reamer, 105 Ind. 318 at 323, 4 N.E. 857 (1886); Pittsburgh, C.C.
& St. L. R. Co. v. Lightheiser, 168 Ind. 438, 78 N.E. 1033 (1906). More detailed dis·
cussion will be offered in a forthcoming issue of the Indiana Law Journal.
140 Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426 at 433 (1882); Woolery v. Louisville, N.A. & C.
R. Co., 107 Ind. 381 at 386, 8 N.E. 226 (1886); 3 LoWE, WoRKS' hrorANA PRACTICE
§55.2 (1950).
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1940, however, seems to have refurbished the existent doctrine as
to respective responsibility of court and parties as to adequacy.141
Decisions since adoption of Indiana's rule 51-like rule show that
counsel must not have been in the general habit of cooperating with
the trial court by pointing out defects or omissions in instructions.
Time after time the reviewing courts have had to invoke the new rule
as to requests-or-objections. Perhaps the leading interpretation is Allman 11. Malshury in which the court said:
"As the rule now stands, the attorneys must share with the
court the burden of correctly instructing the jury. If the fault in
an instruction is so slight or so chimerical that a person trained in
law . . . cannot, in the period of time given for an examination
thereof, perceive anything detrimental . . . then certainly the . . .
jury ... should not be ... misled [thereby]."142

In the next year it was said:
"The rule may seem harsh, but when consideration is given to
the method of settling the instructions, the apparent harshness
vanishes. The rule places a burden on the objector to point out to
the court the specific reason for the refusal or modification requested ... and [all hands have] the same opportunity...."143
· Many more good reasons for the rule, and for maintaining a rather
strict and literal compliance therewith are to be found in the cases.144
It must be remembered, however, that the trial judge's duty is pretty
well relegated to passing upon instructions, and not much duty upon
the court is enforceable. The system contemplates attorney-instruction,
however, so it seems only reasonable that attorney (party) responsibility should be high. The extremes of Missouri and Illinois on the one
hand, and of Nebraska and Oklahoma on the other, are thus avoided
in this Indiana solution. This result resembles that of Iowa, and is
what may be expected under new rules in Kentucky.
Adequacy of the charge seems an almost insoluble problem in some
states like these, where it is not customary to think in terms of much
power of the court in connection with the charge (or instructions, one
141 Ind. Ann. Stat. (Bums, 1946 Repl.) vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 5, rule 1-7. The cited rule
1-7 is similar to the federal rule regarding the necessity for requests and objections.
142224 Ind. 177 at 201, 65 N.E. (2d) 106 (1946).
143 McCague v. N.Y., C. & St. L. R. Co., 225 Ind. 83 at 87, 71 N.E. (2d) 569
(1947).
144 Keeshin Motor Express Co. v. Sowers, 221 Ind. 440, 48 N.E. (2d) 459 (1943);
Beatty v. McClellan, 121 Ind. App. 242, 96 N.E. (2d) 675 (1951).
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should say here). In the circuit generally it is customary to render the
acceptable requests without modification, and the stultified result is
quite what one would expect. Wisconsin took the special verdict
escape. Illinois' premature revision of 1933 must have been ahead of
its time; its failure set the state practice back to that of I 847 as to instructions.145 Indiana is following the federal rule pattern of Michigan, and, as will be seen, Indiana in turn is being followed in this
respect by Kentucky.
SIXTH

Cmcurr

STATES

Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee
These states are senior members of the national family, although
Michigan, admitted in 1837 as the 26th state, is by far the youngest
member of this group. Incidentally, this youngest state-with a population increase of 21 percent-is the fastest growing. Kentucky, admitted in 1792 as the 15th state, is the oldest, and its growth in the
ten-year period was only 6 percent. In general the population increase
of this group is about in line with the national average increase. The
metropolitan congestion problem is in fact present in all, but Michigan
and Kentucky dockets are in good shape, and only one center in Kentucky (Knoxville-Knox County) is running behind. Ohio, with its
scattered medium-large cities, shows a very ragged situation, with
Cleveland, Columbus, and Akron dockets in particular from eighteen
to fourteen months behind.
Only two of these states, Ohio and Kentucky, followed the midnineteenth-century code movement. At present, Ohio and Tennessee
have little judicial rule-making. Michigan, to the contrary, has considerable, although it is interwoven with statute. In Kentucky there has
been a recent activation of the rule-making power, which will be
described.
Speaking always here only as to this present group, in Kentucky
alone does instruction precede the arguments-apart from the Ohio
system of giving special instructions before (and general instructions
after) the closing addresses of counsel. Oral general charges are contemplated in Michigan and Ohio, are permissive in Kentucky and
145 " ••• the legislature of 1846 passed a law requiring all instructions to the jury to
be given in writing, and that there should be no exceptions or explanations but such as
should be given in writing also. Whether this will be an improvement of the law remains
to be seen ...•" Fonn, A HisTORY OF h.LINOIS ••• TO 1847, p. 85 (1854).
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Tennessee (and very generally used in the latter by custom). Comment is forbidden everywhere except Michigan, and there ·is no custom
of summarizing elsewhere, although such review is theoretically
possible in Ohio and Tennessee.146 In none of these states is the absolute and unqualified duty to charge fully ex sua motu found (as in
Nebraska, i.e.) although the trial judge's duty to charge is high in
Michigan. The other extreme, that of Missouri where the court has
no function other than the transmission of correct and applicable requests, is not found anywhere here, on the other hand. Generally,
these systems, in this group lying east of the Ohio and Mississippi
rivers, might be called eastern as opposed to western in style.
Michigan. Since every factor deemed to make for adequacy of
the charge is here to be found, Michigan is shown white on the map.
There is nevertheless considerable difficulty with the court's duty to
initiate instructions, regardless of counsel's nonfeasance, as to basic
issues and fundamental matters. Such may be seen in cases from
Barton 11. Gray1 47 in 1885 down through Brown 11. Nichols decided
late in 1953.148 The cases are not frequent enough, especially since
the inception of Court Rule 37, section 9 (like rule 51), to indicate
any great threat to the £.nality of judgments.149 A 1950 case, for that
matter, invoked the court rule in a case where there had been no charge
on the driver's duty to be able to stop within the clear distance ahead.
Counsel for the plaintiff was held to have waived such instruction by
failure to request.urn The latter result is believed salutary, since enforcement of an overly high duty on the part of the court seems a selflimiting process, as is demonstrated in the experiences of Florida and
Connecticut which will be recited in due course. On the other hand,
it is well to have a rule, as here, that does not lift the threshold of
fundamental error too high.
Ohio. Adequate descriptions of Ohio's double-header system of
instructions are not hard to £.nd.161 It is also possible to £.nd recent
146 Mich.:

27 TEMPLE L.Q. 143 (1953); Ohio: 1954 WASH. Umv. L.Q. 190;

Tenn.: id. at 196.
147 57 Mich. 622, 24 N.W. 638 (1885).
148 337 Mich. 684, 60 N.W. (2d) 907 (1953).
149 Rule 37, §9; Mich. Court Rules 1931, 1933, 1935; SEARL, M:rCH. CotmT RULES
ANN., 4th ed., (1933) p. 252 and (Cum. Supp. 1948) p. 73. Reversal for failure to instruct on contributory negligence: Jorgensen v. Howland, 325 Mich. 440 at 447, 38 N.W.
(2d) 906 (1949).
16DLinendoll v. Te Paske, 327 Mich. 129 at 136, 41 N.W. (2d) 345 (1950).
161 Shibley, "Special Instructions on Law by Counsel Before Argument," 11 Omo ST.
L.J. 321 (1950). 1 FEss, lNsTRUCTIONS To Jtmms IN Omo, cc. 4 & 5 (1952). Monroeville v. Root, 54 Ohio St. 523, 44 N.E. 234 (1896).
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discussions of the adequacy problem in several accessible places.152
As to the special requests which are read to the jury before argument,
the court has a mandatory duty to give all which are correct and applicable.153 There is no margin for error here. As to the forgotten men,
the jurors, it is doubtful whether these special instructions go far
toward adequacy of enlightenment, as the system has become one of
great technicality. 154
There is a perhaps laudably high duty-to-charge placed upon the
court as to the general charge which follows arguments.155 Counsel
are by no means excused from all responsibility, however. The principles applied seem to approach the so-called sufficient-to-suggest rule
which will be discussed more particularly under Kentucky.156 At any
rate, there is a great twilight zone as to what matters are so sufficiently
fundamental as to permit the basing of later complaint upon a prior
general objection. The cited cases and local literature show the adequacy problem to remain as yet unsolved under this system.

Kentucky. Instructions cases may be found in the Kentucky reports as early as 1808,1 57 and frequent references in legal articles are
seen as to the fact that this state was in the path of the :6.rst wave of an
early American reaction induced by fear of judicial domination.158
Survival of that attitude was shown in 1929 when a Kentucky trial
lawyer spoke up in meeting in the following fashion:
"I have practiced . . . forty-four years. . . . My experience is
that nearly all of those judges exercise more power than they
should and my judge is the best of the whole lot. Why you
hardly know that he is in court. He just sits on the bench or down
152 Shibley, note 151 supra; note, 11 Omo ST. L.J. 383-393 (1950).
153 Used Car Co. v. Hemperly, 120 Ohio St. 400, 166 N.E. 364 (1929).
154 American Steel Packing Co. v. Conkle, 86 Ohio St. 117 at 123, 99 N.E. 89 (1912);
Leonardi v. Habermann Provision Co., 143 Ohio St. 623, 56 N.E. (2d) 232 (1944);
Deckant v. Cleveland, 155 Ohio St. 498, 99 N.E. (2d) 609 (1951).
155 Judge Fess prefaces his treatise on instructions (note 151 supra) with quotations
from cases as to the judicial duty to charge, citing Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Lockwood,
72 Ohio St. 586 at 590, 74 N.E. 1071 (1905); Simko v. Miller, 133 Ohio St. 345, 13
N.E. (2d) 914 (1938). He then observes, "The bi!te noir of the trial judge is the charging
of the jury."
156 Roberts v. Fargo, 93 Ohio App. 400, 113 N.E. (2d) 678 (1952); King v. Ohio
Nat. Bank of Columbus, 62 Ohio App. 266, 23 N.E. (2d) 847 (1939); I Fsss, lNsrnocnoNs To Jcmms IN Omo §5.1 (1952).
157 Owings & Co. v. Trotter and Scott, 4 Ky. 157 (1808). Court may of its own
motion instruct the jury upon law: Clarke v. Baker, 30 Ky. 194 (1832).
158 Johnson, ''Province of the Judge in Jury Trials," 12 J. AM. Jon. Soc. 76 (1928),
14 MAss. L.Q. No. 1, p. 48 (1928); 7 TENN. L. Rsv. 107 (1929); Hogan, ''The Strangled
Judge," 22 VT. S.B.A. 13 (1929).

538

MrcmGAN

LAw R.Evmw

[ Vol. 53

among the lawyers and says 'overruled' or 'sustained'. That is the
way a judge ought to do. A judge has no business dominating a
court.111119

It was natural that difficulty should arise in a system that jealously
scrutinizes judicial utterances for anything bordering on comment.
Instruction which leaned too far away from comment became so vague
that it tended to make the jury judges of both law and facts. The
dilemma is demonstrated by recurrent admissions in the cases that
''the line of demarcation between a specific or concrete instruction, and
one which violates the rule of undue 1prominence, cannot be definitely
declared."160
·
The basic attitude toward the judicial duty derived from that which
will be seen in Virginia. It is rooted in the viewpoint that there is in
the first instance no judicial duty to initiate instruction-that the duty
is rather that of responding to the requests of counsel.161 It was inevitably found that such was an insufficient guarantee of adequate instruction, and there developed what has heretofore been mentioned as the
sufficient-to-suggest rule. That rule was thus stated by the United
States Supreme Court in 1916:
"In Kentucky if instructions are offered upon any issue respecting which the jury should be instructed and they are incorrect
in form or substance, it is the duty of a trial court to prepare or
direct the preparation of a proper instruction upon the point in
place of the defective ones."162
The question of interpretation in this rule is that of how far from
the mark may a request be and yet serve to "suggest." The main principle seems to be that the request may be farther from the bull's-eye in
criminal cases than in civil, when it is to serve to put the court on
notice. Apart from that distinction, however, each case must stand
upon its own facts. 163 Again, it follows from the low initial duty that
159 "Let Lawyers Conduct the Court," in Side Lights on Jw:y Trial, 13 J. AM. Jan.
Soc. 124 (1929).
160Louisville v. Cope, 296 Ky. 207, 176 S.W. (2d) 390 (1943). West Kentucky
Coal Co. v. Davis, 138 Ky. 667, 128 S.W. 1074 (1910); C., N.O. & T.P.R. Co. v. Hill's
Admr., (Ky. 1905) 89 S.W. 523.
161 Jones v. Saunders, 284 Ky. 571, 145 S.W. (2d) 514 (1940); STANLEY, lNsTRuc•
TIONS To JURIEs IN KENTUCKY §13 (1948 Supp.).
162C. & 0. R. Co. v. De Atley, 241 U.S. 310 at 316, 36 S.Ct. 64 (1916). Other
cases collected in note, 22 CoL. L. REv. 162 (1922), esp. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Craft,
192 Ky. 314, 233 S.W. 741 (1921).
163Thomas v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky. 790, 143 S.W. 409 (1912). See STANLEY,
INsTRoCTioNs To JURIEs IN KENTUCKY, §6 (1948 Supp.). The note in 22 CoL. L. REv.
162 (1922), disapproves this Kentucky rule by reason of its vagueness.
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if counsel submit their own instructions, and no objection is offered,

the court may give them as submitted.164 The latter doctrine was
obfuscated by lack of agreement as to the nature of the exception necessary to preserve the question for review, as shown by a recent Kentucky law review note.165 It is therefore a relief to see that a modification
of rule 51 became effective in Ke~tucky in July of 1953.166
It will be seen that Kentucky has made a considerable change in
the second sentence of that rule, which in its version reads: "the court
shall give or refuse the instructions and shall give the jury written
instructions before the commencement of the argument to the jury."167
Despite the specific retention of some disapproved features of prior
practice, it seems likely that the new rule should make for a clearer
balance of responsibility for the charge. The words "shall give," for
instance, as disjoined from "give and refuse," may raise the duty of the
court commensurably with the increased responsibility of counsel for
the pointing out of error.

Tennessee. Apart from basic or unusual matters, as to which there
is a judicial duty to initiate instruction, the Tennessee position seems
to be in the middle of the road. Mere meagerness, without positive
error, is no cause for the disturbance of a jury verdict.168 There is
nevertheless little encouragement for counsel to "bank" on omissions
not timely called to the court's attention. The entire spirit of the
arrangement that requests follow the general charge are insurance that
the court will give a general charge on the main issues and contentions.169 The practical burden on the judge is great, however, since
a deluge of requests after the principal charge must truly cause him to
be hurried and harried. It is interesting to see that Tennessee dockets
164 Discussed in STANLEY, !Nsrnuc::noNs To JURIEs IN KENTUCKY
165 38 KY. L. R:Ev. 630 (1950).

§13 (1948 Supp.).

166 Ky. Rules of Civ. Proc., eff. July 1, 1953. Sec. 317 of CIVIL Com; OF KENTUCKY
is now superseded by rule 51. As to the new rules generally see 17 KY. S.B.J. 78 at 125
(1953).
167 The second sentence of Federal Rules Civ. Proc., rule 51, reads: ''The court shall
inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury,
but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed."
168 Mariner v. Smith, 66 Tenn. 423 at 426 (1874); Citizens Street Ry. v. Burke, 98
Tenn. 650 at 653, 40 S.W. 1085 (1897); Howell v. Acc. & Cas. Ins. Co., 32 Tenn. App.
83, 221
(2d) 901 (1949).
169Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §§8809 and 8810 (civil); id., §§11749-11751
(criminal). Requests need not be heeded if submitted before close of the principal charge:
Railway Companies v. Foster, 88 Tenn. 671 at 673, 13 S.W. 694 (1890). See 1954 WASH.
Umv. L.Q. 196-198, esp. n. 142, being description by Prof. Forrest W. Lacey (of the law
faculty of the University of Tennessee) of this procedure in action.
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are so nearly current in the light of increasing population and this
essentially cumbersome arrangement:

In this group the two states in which real change and improvement
are seen are the two in which there has been a substantial development
of the rule-making power-Michigan and Kentucky. Since the Michigan dockets are in healthy shape, it is apparent that its general proce- ·
dural system is geared to a point which permits enforcement of a rather
high judicial duty to charge. The fact that some Kentucky dockets are
congested, plus its recent adoption of the federal rules, may mean that it
is seeking faster and more efficient methods. The cumbersome Ohio
method shows a need for consideration there of the same sort of improvement. As to Tennessee, the fact that the trial judges are in fact allowed
considerable discretion as to management of the details of trial may be
the factor which permits a somewhat inconvenient, although otherwise
comme~dable system, to keep pace with the times.

To be concluded.

